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Welfare Benefits in Highly Decentralized Fiscal Systems: 
Evidence on Interterritorial Mimicking 
 
Luis Ayala1     Ana Herrero2     Jorge Martinez-Vazquez3 
April 2019 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly 
fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of 
mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government 
policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empirically we 
focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional governments during 
the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role played 
by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act 
accordingly, and this takes place even in a context of low mobility of 
households. Moreover, we find evidence of vertical externalities: even in a 
completely decentralized framework, regions consider the benefits set by the 
central government as a benchmark when determining their own welfare benefit 
levels. 
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The benefits of fiscal devolution have been extensively highlighted in the economic 
literature. A decentralized provision of public services is supposed to foster citizens´ 
wellbeing, since it allows territories to adjust their own policies to the particular needs and 
preferences of their residents. This same literature has traditionally suggested that 
decentralization also boosts public policies innovation, if only because of the larger number 
of agents involved in the process.1 One implication of fiscal federalism working as a public 
policy laboratory is that incumbents are expected not only to innovate but also to make their 
decisions taking into account what their neighbors are currently doing. Put simply, within a 
decentralized model, imitation becomes a cheaper way of finding best practices: governments 
observe what their peers are doing and decide to implement the most successful policies 
within their own territories. 
One of the areas where mimicking could have special relevance is that of the 
determination of welfare benefit levels. The potential interactions among subnational 
governments when setting their welfare benefit levels raise numerous interesting questions 
and have been a major focus of policy research. An extensive literature on welfare 
inequalities across jurisdictions has revolved around regions’ strategic behavior and the 
possible responses of subnational governments to changes in welfare policies in neighboring 
jurisdictions (Schroder, 1995; Berry et al., 2003; Baicker, 2005a; Fiva and Rattsø, 2006; and 
Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008). Another large literature has focused on the price and income 
effects of federal grants in terms of differences of benefits across jurisdictions (Ribar and 
Wilhelm, 1999; Baicker, 2005b; Chernick, 1998, 2000; Marton and Wildasin, 2007; and 
Toolsema and Allers, 2014). 
                                                          
1 For example, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) show in a theoretical model that federations generate larger 




Most of these studies have examined the possible effect of inter-territorial interaction 
in welfare programs in contexts where there are federal funds to match jurisdictions' 
expenditures in federal schemes based on block grants. Far less research has been dedicated 
to examine the extent to which mimicking may have a role in welfare systems where there is 
neither federal funding nor federal coordination.  
In addition, a different body of literature has studied the vertical interaction among 
different levels of government (federal and regional), which can affect the decisions made in 
each region. For example, vertical externalities have been extensively discussed in the 
context of multilevel taxation: larger tax rates set by one level of government might erode the 
tax bases available to higher or lower levels of government (Keen, 1998; Esteller-Moré and 
Solé-Ollé, 2001). However, in the case of welfare benefits, little is known so far about these 
possible interactions. One question is whether in the context of completely decentralized 
welfare schemes, regions might still consider the benefits set by the central government on 
other welfare issues, such as Social Security benefits, as a benchmark when determining their 
own welfare benefit levels. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the determinants of welfare benefit levels 
within a completely decentralized context. More specifically, we will be analyzing the role of 
intergovernmental interaction (mimicking) as a driver of the institutional design of those 
subnational government welfare policies in a context where there is neither federal policy co-
ordination nor financing, that is, within a completely decentralized system. The basic 
question we want to analyse is whether the effects between neighbouring jurisdictions that 
occur when there is a common funding system also are present when there is complete 
decentralization. This is an issue for which heretofore the evidence has been scarce. In 
addition, we are also interested in researching the extent to which regions in completely 




Security pensions) in their territories as a benchmark when determining their own regional 
welfare benefit levels. 
Empirically, we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional 
governments (Autonomous Communities, ACs hereafter) during the period 1996-2015. The 
Spanish case provides a novel opportunity to research the role of intergovernmental 
interaction in shaping welfare benefit policies in highly fiscally decentralized systems. In 
Spain, these programs were entirely created and regulated by the ACs themselves without any 
participation of the central government in their design, regulation or financing.  
Because of the clean slate, and therefore lack of historical inertia, the role of self-
innovation and imitation across ACs should be expected to be much stronger. Interestingly, 
and in contrast, most of the remaining regional social expenditure policies in Spain actually 
derive from largely devolved responsibilities and for which the central government still plays 
coordinating and financing roles. When analyzing these other social service policies, we find 
that the pre-devolution level of provision generated a strong inertia in the actual evolution of 
the ACs’ budgets once they were in charge. However, unlike all those other devolved powers, 
welfare benefit spending is not financed with any specific transfer coming from the central 
government, but with regional governments´ general own resources. In summary, the analysis 
of the determination of welfare benefits at the Spanish regional level provides a novel unique 
opportunity to test the mimicking hypothesis within the context of what could be considered 
an “extreme model of decentralization”. 
To test the mimicking hypothesis, we first implement a two-stage-least-squares model 
that addresses the potential endogeneity problem of some of our covariates. Secondly, and in 
order to tackle the inertia that usually affects budgetary variables, we run a dynamic (Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors) model. Our empirical results lend strong support to the mimicking 




The main contribution of the paper, therefore, is that the hypothesis of mimicking in welfare 
benefits is fulfilled not only in frameworks where there is federal coordination but also in 
contexts of complete decentralization of these policies. And this occurs not only in 
frameworks in which governments fear to attract poor households when implementing more 
generous anti-poverty policies, but also in the context of low mobility of households, as is the 
case of Spain. Therefore, our results point to the fact that inter-territorial interactions take 
place not only due to the mobility of households, but also due to other reasons, as for 
example, strategic behavior toward potential voting outcomes, or perhaps even 
straightforward learning processes. We also find that regions use the social security benefits 
set by the central government in their own territory as a benchmark when determining their 
own welfare benefit levels. This shows the presence of vertical externalities even in a context 
of complete decentralization. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief 
explanation of the institutions surrounding Spanish regional welfare benefits. Section 3 
revisits the previous relevant literature on intergovernmental mimicking and advances a 
simple theoretical framework to guide our empirical analysis. In section 4, we present our 
empirical approach. In section 5 we discuss the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Spanish regional welfare benefits programs: the institutional framework  
The Spanish system of welfare benefits is somewhat singular in a comparative 
framework. Despite the remarkable advances of the Spanish welfare state since the mid-
1970s, access to social assistance for the needy population remains a weak area. The current 
system is the sum of widely diverse benefit systems, which were conceived at different points 
of time according to very different logics. The result is a flawed mosaic of benefits, showing 
high levels of horizontal inequity and quite heterogeneous levels of protection for individuals 




The last resort of the safety net consists of the Minimum Income programs of each of 
the regional governments (ACs). Potential claimants can apply for these benefits only if they 
have used up entitlement to the other benefit programs. All households below a given income 
threshold set by each region may be eligible for these programs. Eligibility conditions are 
restricted to an upper age limit (65 years of age, at which age claimants can benefit from the 
national non-contributory pension scheme) and a lower age limit (25 years of age, except for 
claimants with dependent children). Along with these requirements, and in order to prevent 
the formation of fictitious family units solely aimed at receiving the benefit, households must 
have been formed for a defined period before claiming that benefit. Another legal 
requirement is that of being officially registered in the corresponding region as a resident, 
although both national citizens and non-citizens are eligible. Most programs tax 100% of 
other social benefits as well as earned incomes. However, some regions have introduced 
exceptions to encourage labor market participation, such as the compatibility of earnings and 
benefits during some months, or the decision not to consider specific means-tested benefits 
for elderly household members in determining household benefits. In most regions, benefits 
are granted for one year, automatically renewable. 
These regional welfare schemes have played an increasing importance in regional 
budgets since their creation in the late eighties, with their beneficiaries growing in numbers 
even during the expansive phase of the economic cycle prior to the 2008 crisis. The number 
of beneficiaries currently amounts approximately 500.000 people (1.7% of the total 
population), with an increasing trend–although showing strong diversity across ACs. 
Together with their quantitative importance, these programs have a policy design 
appeal for one important reason. Their fully decentralized design allows a close analysis of 
the advantages and disadvantages of an extreme or radical fiscal federalism model of social 




their welfare benefits completely ex novo, without reference to any pre-existing structure at 
the central level. Therefore, without central master lines, each territory was completely free to 
decide the potential beneficiaries (eligibility), the benefit levels, the temporal limits, and all 
other aspects of the programs. This setup resulted in striking differences in regulations and 
outcomes. When analyzing the institutional design, we observe highly diverse levels of 
protection, even larger than the ones observed in truly federal countries.2  
The variety of results and the limited economic sufficiency of the Spanish regional 
welfare schemes become more obvious when one considers the adequacy ratios used by other 
European Union countries –expressed as the ratio between benefit levels and the poverty 
thresholds.3 Whereas in countries like Denmark the benefits practically cover the total risk of 
poverty and the indicators of Anglo-Saxon countries are not far off the 75 percent mark, the 
majority of Central European countries offer adequacy levels between 50 and 70 percent of 
the poverty line. Nevertheless, all of them are higher than the average of the Spanish ACs, 
which was below 44 percent in 2015. However, this average value hides a great diversity of 
practices. While some regions provide medium-low benefit levels (Aragón, Asturias, the 
Balearic Islands, and Castile and León) and others are even in the top part (the Basque 
Country and Navarre), most regions show low or very low adequacy indicators vis-à-vis 
within the European practice. Those differences underline the pronounced heterogeneity 
within Regional Minimum Income schemes, especially with a marked difference between 
benefit levels.  
Figure 1 illustrates how much the level of benefits differs across Spanish regional 
programs. These differences widen considerably as the size of the household receiving the 
                                                          
2 Even though heavily decentralized, formally, Spain is a unitary country. 
3 We measure adequacy ratios comparing benefit levels (MISSOC Comparative Tables Database, 2015) and 
poverty lines (EU-SILC, European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2016). We use the EU-




benefits increases. While regions such as the Basque Country or Navarre pay benefits close to 
1,000 Euros to larger households, in a quarter of the regions the level of benefits is below 500 
Euros.  
It is not clear what the true drivers of that diversity are. There is still little empirical 
evidence on the potential roles played by regional needs (poverty levels), preferences 
(sensitivity to distributional issues/ideology), and regional financial capabilities.4 Casual 
evidence would seem to suggest that the especially favorable financing system enjoyed by the 
so-called “foral” (charter) regions is the main reason for the large differences between their 
welfare benefits and those provided in the rest of the country—the “common regime” 
regions.5 However, it is important to remark that, even though ACs with greater spending 
capacity tend to offer higher than average benefits, that is not always the case. For example, 
one of the richest regions, Madrid, offers comparatively low levels of benefits.  
3. Literature review and theoretical framework  
3.1. Literature review 
Diversity is the expected result of fiscal federalism models. Each territory has the 
power to decide –at least to a certain extent– how much public services to provide, how much 
taxes to collect, and the distributional pattern of both services and taxes. Within a correct 
institutional design, this generates welfare gains, since the regional fiscal package will better 
satisfy citizens´ preferences and needs versus the assumed central uniform model of provision 
(Oates, 1972). However, as we have already previously remarked, it is not always possible to 
                                                          
4 While the first two cases would be a positive outcome of decentralization, the last one would be an undesirable 
effect of a badly designed regional financing system (Prud´homme, 1994; Buchanan, 1965). 
5 The regional governments of the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy a privileged financing system by which 
they are allowed to collect on their own basically all taxes within their respective territories. As a compensation 
for the services provided by the central government, both regions implement a bottom-up transfer, the calculation 
of which historically has resulted in a very generous advantageous financial system for these two regions. In 
contrast, the so-called “common-system regions” only accrue revenues from some own taxes, revenue sharing in 




affirm that the current diversity of regional expenditure is a direct result of differences in 
territorial preferences and needs, but rather it may be the result of the asymmetric distribution 
of economic activity and territorial fiscal capacity (Buchanan, 1950).  
The literature on the determinants of sub-central spending is large. From the 
perspective of public services demand, evidence on the impact of demographic, ethnic and 
religious characteristics of territories can be found in Castles (1989), Cutler et al. (1993), Di 
Mateo and Di Mateo (1998), Costa-Font and Rico (2007), Sanz and Velázquez (2007), 
Cantarero and Lago (2012), and Magazzino and Melle (2012). For example, higher shares of 
population over 65 or under 16 tend to increase health care or education expenditure needs 
respectively. More evidence on the impact of demographics, testing the intergenerational 
competition hypothesis, can be found in Falch and Rattsø (1997), Fernández and Rogerson 
(1997), Poterba (1997) and Busemeyer (2007). Groups with a higher representation or share 
in the total population tend to restrict the growth of those services from which they benefit 
less. Also from the perspective of public services demand, Wagner´s Law has been 
extensively tested. The evidence in this case is mixed, but it appears that those analyses 
implemented at the regional level rule out the possibility of public services behaving as 
luxury goods (Di Mateo and Di Mateo, 1998; Falch and Rattsø, 1999; López-Casasnovas and 
Sáez, 2006; Busemeyer, 2006; Costa-Font, 2010; Herrero and Tránchez, 2016). Finally, the 
location and settlement of population can affect the territorial distribution of facilities and 
human resources. Population density and congestion can affect the ways and costs with which 
public services can be provided. Most of the evidence on this topic points to the existence of 
economies of scale in the provision of public services up to some degree (Poterba, 1997; 
Nguyen, Häkkinen and Pekurinen, 2009; Martínez-Vázquez et al., 2017).  
The supply of public services is also conditioned by an array of factors. First, the 




administrations tend to spend more, according to Castles (1989), Falch and Rattsø (1999), 
Snyder and Yackolev (2000), Costa-Font and Pons-Novell (2007), and Herrero and Tránchez 
(2016). Second, institutional elements such as government fragmentation, political alignment, 
or the level of decentralization can either increase or reduce the level of spending (Falch and 
Rattsø, 1999; Painter and Bae, 2001; Pons-Novel, 2007; López-Casasnovas et al. 2005; 
Costa-Font, 2010).  
As we also have remarked above, another critical element that affects the supply of 
public services is the level of sub-central financial resources. Beblavý (2010), Cantarero and 
Lago (2012) and Herrero and Tránchez (2016) find strong evidence, not surprisingly, on the 
impact of regional financial resources in the distribution of sub-central public spending. 
However, it is important to highlight that most of the literature cited above ignores the 
territorial interdependency of policy decisions. Nevertheless, there is a significant separate 
literature studying how governments tend to observe what their neighbors do, and act 
accordingly for different reasons. First, public policies of one region can affect citizens living 
in other territories due to service spillovers (Case and Rosen, 1993). Second, governments 
can have strategic behavior for different reasons. For example, they can implement fiscal 
competition in order to induce factor mobility and attract resources residing in other 
jurisdictions (Solé-Ollé, 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2005; Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et 
al, 2003; Johnson, 2014) or they might want to stimulate some factors (for instance, poor 
households) moving to other jurisdictions. Strategic behavior might also occur when 
incumbents feel that citizens will evaluate their performance in relative terms to what their 
neighbor governments are doing. (Besley and Case, 1995; Boarnet and Glazer, 2002; 
Caldeira, 2010; Dahlber and Edmark, 2008; Fiva and Rattsø, 2006; Revelli and Tovno, 2007; 
Rincke, 2007 and 2009). Inter-territorial influence can also occur due to the existence of 




Focusing on the main interest of this paper on decentralized welfare benefits, the 
previous literature has mainly analyzed territorial interdependency to test whether migration 
of poor households due to the generosity of welfare benefits causes a race-to-the-bottom and 
whether migration of rich households and firms causes a race-to-the-bottom of tax rates and 
benefit levels. In the former body of literature, the bottom-line idea is that households 
migrating to those jurisdictions with higher benefits would discourage governments from 
improving their welfare coverage. The empirical evidence on this particular issue is mixed. 
While Dahlberg and Edmark (2008), Gramlich (1982), Tweedie (1994) and Smith (1991) find 
evidence of a race-to-the-bottom, a number of other studies by Berry et al. (2003), Fiva and 
Rattsø (2006) and Shroder (1995) find no evidence that such a competition game regarding 
welfare benefits actually exists. However, it is important to remark that migration of poor 
households is not a necessary condition for governments to influence each other. It would be 
enough for a government to fear attracting the poor in order for that to influence their 
behavior and for competition to take place.6 This is more in line with what we are expecting 
to find in the Spanish case, since Spanish poor households are extremely immobile, but in 
spite of that there seems to be a multilateral surveillance through which all territories 
influence each other regarding social policies in general and welfare benefits in particular.  
Besides the horizontal interdependence of regional policies, the literature on fiscal 
federalism has also analyzed the existence of vertical externalities: decisions made at one 
level of government condition those made by upper or lower levels of administration. This 
vertical interdependence has been analyzed in depth in the context of tax policy design and 
fiscal space of the different administration levels (Keen, 1998; Esteller-More and Solé-Ollé, 
2001; Dahlby and Wilson 2003; Anderson et al., 2004; Martínez-López, 2005). The general 
                                                          
6 Brueckner (1998) surveyed the empirical evidence on welfare migration, concluding that while the evidence is 




view is that the overexploitation of tax bases by one level of government tends to erode other 
governments´ tax bases and therefore results in lower tax yields. However, when it comes to 
expenditure programs in general, and welfare benefits in particular, this kind of vertical 
externalities have been much less studied in the previous literature. From the perspective of 
the current paper, there is a need to analyze to what extent subnational governments use 
central administration´s benefits (Social Security pensions) as a benchmark when determining 
their own welfare benefit levels. 
3.2. A basic model for inter-territorial mimicking in social welfare policies 
As stated above, mimicking is based upon “informational” externalities among 
neighbouring jurisdictions that are mainly channelled through epistemic networks. Within a 
decentralized context, territories imitate each other under this process of finding best 
practices through innovation.  
In the prototypical model of this type of competition the key variable is the reaction 
function of every government to changes in the benefit levels in other jurisdictions. Formally, 
consider a set of N jurisdictions, in each of which there are identical taxpayers (ri) and 
identical non-taxpayer individuals who are recipients of the welfare program (ci). In a given 
jurisdiction i, total population is pi=ri+ci. We assume that taxpayers have preferences for 
redistribution and care about the income levels of the poor individuals (non-taxpayers) in that 
jurisdiction. Hence, the utility of taxpayers depends on their own disposable income (yi) and 
on the jurisdiction’s welfare expenditure per recipient (ei): 
U(ri) = U(yi, ei; xi)  [1] 





The budget constraint corresponding to a taxpayer in jurisdiction i can be expressed 
as: 
yi = Yi - Riei   [2] 
where Yi is gross income and Ri is the ratio of beneficiaries as a proportion of taxpayers in the 
jurisdiction (Ri = ci / ri).  
As shown by Revelli (2006), given this constraint, utility maximization gives rise to a 
function for welfare expenditure —using the standard log-linear specification7— given by: 
ln(𝑒𝑖) = ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ln(𝑥𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾𝑌ln⁡(𝑌𝑖
𝐽
𝑗=1 ) + 𝛿𝑅ln⁡(𝑅𝑖) + 𝑖  [3] 
If we assume that welfare policies in other jurisdictions may have an effect on voters, and 
consequently on incumbent politicians, equation (3) needs to be extended to include the 
welfare expenditure levels in the neighbouring jurisdictions. The impact of welfare policies in 
those jurisdictions on the expenditure level in jurisdiction i can be modelled as a weighted 
average of neighbouring jurisdictions’ expenditures: 
ln(𝑒𝑖) = ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ln(𝑥𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾𝑌ln⁡(𝑌𝑖
𝐽
𝑗=1 ) + 𝛿𝑅ln⁡(𝑅𝑖) + 𝜆𝑒[∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑛ln⁡(𝑒𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1 ] + 𝑖 [4] 
where in are the weights corresponding to the neighboring jurisdictions and  represents the 
government´s response function to welfare designs in those jurisdictions. The reaction 
function included in the last expression is linear, and it may slope up or down. The slope will 
be zero in the case where imitation is absent. As stressed by different authors, there is an 
econometric problem in estimating equation (4) since the expenditure levels on the right-
hand-side are endogenous variables given that the expenditure benefit levels in all 
jurisdictions are jointly determined via strategic interactions (see, for example, Dahlberg and 
Edmark, 2008). 
                                                          




We can now utilize this same framework for the analysis of benefit levels –in lieu of 
expenditures. Let bit be the benefit level for the welfare program in jurisdiction i at time t. 
Benefits in that jurisdiction are a function of total income of taxpayers, socioeconomic 
characteristics and the recipiency ratio in the jurisdiction, and the welfare benefits in 
neighbouring jurisdictions.  
One difference with the previous literature is that we also account for the potential 
presence of vertical externalities. Our full specification of the reaction function shows not 
only how a given jurisdiction reacts to changes in the benefit levels in neighboring regions, 
but also an additional term accounts for how the welfare benefits in each jurisdiction may be 
affected by changes in other social benefits (such as Social Security pensions) that are set by 
the central government. If this assumption of vertical interdependence holds, [4] becomes  
ln(𝑏𝑖) = ∑ 𝛼𝑗 ln(𝑥𝑖𝑗) + 𝛾𝑌ln⁡(𝑌𝑖
𝐽
𝑗=1 ) + 𝛿𝑅ln⁡(𝑅𝑖) + 𝜆𝑏[∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑛 ln(𝑏𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1 ] + 𝜆𝑔ln⁡(𝑔) + 𝑖 ⁡⁡[5] 
where g is the benefit level defined by the central government for other social benefits. In our 
specification of [5], the central government sets social security pensions in period t-2. 
Neighbours of region i set their respective welfare benefits in period t-1, taking into account 
pensions determined by the social security. And, finally, region i decides its own welfare 
benefits in period t, conditional on what its neighbours did in the previous year. 
Past research has concluded that welfare migration might alter this equilibrium. As 
stressed by Brueckner (1998), the socially optimal benefit levels correspond to a framework 
in which there is no mobility of beneficiaries between jurisdictions, or that alternatively there 
is a sufficiently balanced system of matching grants that nullify welfare migration. As we 
saw in section two above, the Spanish case of decentralized provision of welfare benefits is 




severe requirements regarding residence, low benefit levels, the important role of extended 
family networks, and the very high percentage of residential property ownership. 
We also may consider that there might be other forms of endogeneity. As shown by 
Moffitt (1999), voters might react negatively to increases in welfare spending by seeking 
retrenchments in the system. Lower levels of benefits or stricter requirements to reduce the 
number of recipients could become endogenous variables used by policy-makers (Ayala and 
Triguero, 2017). That is, governments can change the level of benefits or the recipiency ratio 
to control welfare expenditure. While there may be an endogeneity problem in relation to 
welfare expenditure, it is not so clear that this would be the case when the focus is on the 
benefit level. Jurisdictions can implement different strategies to reduce poverty in their 
territories simultaneously extending different parameters of the programs. In the case of 
regional welfare programs in Spain, the empirical evidence shows that when the objective is 
minimizing poverty, both the benefit level and the relative number of beneficiaries increase 
(Ayala, 2015).  
4. Empirical methodology 
As already mentioned, our main aim is to understand what drives the relative 
generosity of Spanish regional welfare benefits, paying special attention to the potential 
existence of vertical and horizontal externalities. After controlling for supply-demand factors, 
how much do neighbor and central governments´ decisions affect the welfare policies of 
regional governments?  
To answer this question, we use a panel dataset for regional welfare benefits from 
1996 to 2015. The first thing to address is the selection of our dependent variable(s). 
Considering that welfare programs provide different benefit levels targeted to specific types 




more comprehensive nature or most representative of the regional programs universe. For 
that reason, we will be using the maximum amount – received by those who do not have any 
income– corresponding to single persons (the so-called basic benefit) as our dependent 
variable.  
In line with the theoretical model expressed in equation [5], the reaction function of 
government i will depend on the following set of explanatory variables: 
- Taxpayers´ income in the region, proxied as regional GDP per capita (GDPpcit).  
- A vector of regional socioeconomic and institutional characteristics (Xit) including: 
severe poverty (percentage of total households with no income), which captures 
regional social needs; pro-redistribution preferences, which reflect the regional 
residents’ willingness to fight poverty8; government´s ideology, which captures 
regional authorities´ bias towards alleviating poverty; and a dummy variable called 
Foral, which controls for the larger affordability of welfare benefits in the two charter 
regions (the Basque Country and Navarre).  
- The recipiency ratio, expressed as the weight of welfare beneficiaries in the regional 
population (RecipRatioit). 
- Mimicking (horizontal externalities) variables: in order to test whether neighbors´ 
behavior influence the level of generosity of regional welfare benefits, the first thing 
to tackle is to decide which territories are relevant neighbors and which are not. 
Different approaches have been followed in the literature on this specific issue. Some 
authors have used the inverse distance between two territories (Anselin, 1988). With 
this perspective, Pinkse and Slade (1998) use a fixed number of those nearest 
                                                          
8 Pro-redistribution preferences were assessed based on the information provided by the “Opinión Pública y 
Política Fiscal” (Public Opinion and Fiscal Policy) poll implemented each year by the Spanish Center of 
Sociological Research (CIS). Based on the answer to the question “What are taxes used for?”, we used the 
percentage of people answering “They are a tool to better distribute wealth within our society” as a proxy of the 




neighbors. Other researchers have used income levels or ethnic composition (Case et 
al., 1993) and the structure of the social network (Doreian, 1980) as indicators of 
proximity. Here we will be using three other approaches. First, we will follow the 
most commonly used approach, which considers as relevant neighbors only those 
regions that share a common geographical border (“N1” in our estimations). Second, 
we will consider that interdependencies actually take place among all regions, so all 
of them need to be included as neighbors (“N2” in our estimations). In this case, we 
are assuming that a multilateral surveillance process takes place, may be through the 
existence of epistemic networks. And last, regions will be clustered depending on 
their per capita GDP, so that territories with a similar level of income are considered 
neighbors, irrespectively of their geographical location (“Neighborhood 3” in our 
estimations).9 After establishing which regions influence each other, we will follow 
the most usual approach in the literature and construct a matrix of welfare benefits in 
t-1 with the same weight for each neighbor (∑𝑁𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡−1).
10 
- Vertical externalities: here we use the average Social Security´s pensions payed (by 
the central government) in each territory (Pensionit-2) in t-2; as already mentioned, 
this variable tries to capture how decisions made by the central authorities influence 
the level of benefits implemented by ACs. 
As mentioned above, the econometric approach requires taking into account that some 
of the regressors proposed may be endogenous. In particular, the simultaneous determination 
                                                          
9 According to this criterion, regions were clustered into four groups: 1) Madrid and the Basque Country, with a 
GDP per capita over 30.000 Euros; 2) Aragón, Catalonia and Navarre, with a GDP per capita between 25.000 and 
30.000 Euros; 3) Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile-Leon, Valencia, Galicia and Rioja, with a per capita 
GDP between 20.000 and 25.000 Euros; and 4) Andalusia, Canarias, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and 
Murcia, whose GDP falls below 20.000 Euros. 
10 We also used a “placebo” neighborhood in order to test the validity of our three neighborhood criteria. By 
randomly attributing fictious neighbors to both archipelagos we found that the statistical results did not point to a 
mimicking process, while the three real ones did point to the same kind of strategical behavior (although with 




of neighbors´ benefits requires tackling the potential endogeneity problem. However, unlike 
previous studies analyzing the US system, we are not expecting migration movements due to 
changes in welfare benefit programs. As commented above, poor households in Spain are 
extremely immobile –benefit levels are low, and there are strict access requirements 
regarding residence in the region during the previous years–, thus no endogeneity problems 
should be expected regarding the number of beneficiaries.11  
In order to address the endogeneity problem, we adopt a two-stage ordinary least 
squares estimation model, using neighbors´ level of benefits in t-1 as our explanatory 
endogenous variable in the main equation [6], and the average Social Security pension in 
each territory in t-2 as an instrument in the auxiliary instrumental equation [7]:  
𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∑ 𝑁𝑊𝐵𝑗𝑡−1̂𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 +
⁡𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   [6] 
∑ 𝑁𝑊𝐵𝑗𝑡−1𝑗≠𝑖̂ =⁡𝛼0 +∝1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 +∝2 𝑋𝑗𝑡 +∝3 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗𝑡 +∝4 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗𝑡 +⁡ 𝑢𝑗𝑡
   [7] 
where ∑ 𝑁𝑊𝐵𝑗𝑡−1̂𝑗≠𝑖  represents the matrix including the neighbors´ welfare benefits in t-1, 
𝜇𝑖⁡are the fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are the temporal effects, and 𝑖𝑡 and ujt represent the respective 
error terms. Therefore, the logic of our model is that the central government decides Social 
Security pensions in t-2, influencing regions´ welfare benefits in t-1. After that, region i 
decides the maximum amount of basic benefits in year t. 
After analyzing the determinants of regional welfare benefits from a static 
perspective, we check the robustness of the results by running a dynamic model that will 
separately address the influence of neighbors´ policies and any existing inertia. To do so, we 
                                                          
11 The Hausman test was used to check the existence of endogeneity. In this case, the null hypothesis is that both 




use a dynamic approach (Panel Corrected Standard Errors model) that includes the lag of the 
dependent variable as a regressor, therefore controlling for the inertia effect of welfare 
benefits implemented in the previous year: 
𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4∑ 𝑁𝑊𝐵𝑗𝑡−1̂𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 [8] 
where 𝜇𝑖 represents the unobservable heterogeneity, 𝛿𝑡 are the temporal effects, and 𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term. The Panel Corrected Standard Error model separately addresses the inertia of our 
dependent variable by estimating a composite error term ( 𝑖𝑡 in [8]) that includes both an 
autoregressive vector and the usual random walk, that is:  
     𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑊𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 [9] 
As highlighted by Lago et al. (2018), Panel Corrected Standard Errors are robust to 
both cross correlation and cross-section heteroskedasticity. When there are long time lapses –
larger than 20–, the usual bias of autoregressive models with fixed effects becomes small and 
therefore this method is suitable for our sample. 
5. Results 
5.1. Static approach 
Table 1 shows the results obtained when a static strategy (2SLS) is applied. In the first 
case, we show the results for equations 6 and 7, using Social Security pensions as an 
instrument. We test for endogeneity with the Hausman test and, after that, we check that 
Social Security pensions fulfill the two basic requirements to be used as instruments: first, 
they need to be orthogonal to our dependent variable, and second they need to be relevant 
(with explanatory power). Regarding the former, we know that welfare benefits are not 
contingent on Social Security pensions payed in neighboring jurisdictions. As for the 




neighboring territories have explanatory power over welfare benefits in those regions, with 
statistical significance and the expected positive sign. 
After testing for endogeneity, all estimations point to the presence of both horizontal 
and vertical externalities in the design of regional welfare benefits. Neighbors´ benefits act as 
an important driver of own benefits, with a positive and always significant coefficient. And 
this holds for the three different neighborhood criteria explained above. Meanwhile, the 
recipiency ratio shows a positive relationship with benefits reinforcing the previously 
mentioned idea of a simultaneous use of the coverage and the generosity of the program to 
achieve the corresponding poverty reduction goals. 
The results for the first stage (auxiliary) equation also point to the existence of vertical 
externalities: average Social Security pensions payed by the central government in each 
territory seem to be an important driver of neighbors´ basic benefits, and therefore this 
variable appears to work correctly as an instrument (see tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix 
for the results of the auxiliary equation).  
The results also suggest that, under the current institutional design of welfare benefits, 
with no federal funding or coordination whatsoever, regional resources seem to explain the 
generosity of benefits to a good extent. This evidence indicates that, as far as regional welfare 
benefits are concerned, the Spanish model of “radical federalism” in welfare policies does not 
promote inter-territorial cohesion, since it allows the richer to be more generous than the 
poorer regions. This is in line with the literature that has extensively examined the under-
provision of welfare under a decentralized design in the U.S. (Brown and Oates, 1987; 
Brueckner, 2000; Wheaton, 2000; Ayala et al. 2017). These results are further enhanced by 
the significant, positive and large coefficients of the variable “Foral”, which controls for the 
special financial regime of the two charter regions in Spain (Navarre and the Basque 




contribution to inter-territorial solidarity funding, allows them relatively higher resources and 
which they choose to use in part to implement much more generous welfare benefits.12 
Note that our poverty variable does not have a very stable behavior within the model, 
probably due to the high correlation with GDP. However, when significant (under N3), 
“Poverty” displays a positive sign. A similar problem seems to apply to the ideology variable. 
In order to address the potential multicollinearity of both poverty and ideology, we 
introduced an interaction term that shows a significant and positive sign when using N1. 
Table 2 shows the results of an econometric specification identical to the previous ones but 
including this interaction term. In this case, all results are very similar to the ones obtained 
under the first specification of the model and poverty still displays a positive sign under N3, 
but not under N1 and N2. 
Time effects have been addressed under two different strategies. First, year effects 
were included, but the results of the different specifications were not satisfactory.13 When 
introducing a dummy variable that breaks the series into two periods (before and after 
2010),14 the specification displays the expected results, although as can be seen in Table 1, 
the two periods do not seem to be statistically different.  
5.2. Dynamic approach 
Although we find strong evidence of both horizontal and vertical externalities in the 
generosity of basic benefits, it is important to highlight that the results obtained under the 
                                                          
12 Note that results for pro-redistribution preferences were not included in the tables. Although many specifications 
including this variable were tested, no statistical significance seemed to exist in any of them for this particular 
variable. We therefore decided to drop the variable from our estimations.  
13 Time effects were non-significant and collapsed the whole specifications. Those results were not included in 
the paper to save space, but are available from the authors under request. 
14 2010 was the first year in which regional governments started suffering the loss of resources due to the economic 
crisis and was also the moment in which they were forced to implement budget cutbacks in order to fulfill the 
requirements of the excessive deficit protocol applied to Spain by the EU. Therefore, we could expect a change 




static approach could be somewhat biased due to the strong inertia of the budgetary variables, 
in particular the level of welfare benefits.  
In order to check the robustness of the results displayed above, we run a dynamic 
model that allows to disentangle the influence of neighbors´ policies and the role of inertia. 
As we have remarked above, in this specification, the lagged dependent variable is introduced 
as an additional regressor. Table 3 displays the results of the dynamic approach under a Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors model of estimation, with the same regressors used in Table 1.15 
The values of the Rho statistic (around 0.8) point to the existence of an autoregressive 
process, therefore validating the dynamic strategy. 
Once again, we find evidence of the horizontal interdependence of welfare benefits at 
the Spanish regional level: neighbors´ benefits positively affect the amount of each region´s 
own welfare benefits. Furthermore, first stage estimations (see Table A.4 in the Appendix) 
point to the existence of vertical externalities, since Social Security pensions partly explain 
the level of benefits in neighboring jurisdictions.  
In line with what we found under the static strategy, per capita GDP has a positive 
effect in the level of benefits, and so does the special institutional status of the foral 
territories. The recipiency ratio, once again, shows a positive influence on welfare benefits. 
While ideology is still not significant in any of the specifications shown in Table 3, poverty 
becomes significant and with a positive sign under the dynamic approach. 
Table 4 shows the results obtained when an interaction term of poverty and ideology 
is also included as a regressor. The results basically reproduce the conclusions found under 
the previous static and dynamic specifications: regional governments observe what their 
neighbors are doing and then decide their own levels of welfare benefits. The level of 
                                                          
15 We have run several System-GMM specifications in order to address the inertia of the dependent variable. 




regional resources (GDP per capita and Foral variables) also has a positive influence on the 
relative generosity of benefits. Like in the previous dynamic specification, also in this case 
we obtain significant and positive coefficients regarding the poverty variable. 
Summarizing, very similar results are found in both the static and dynamic 
approaches. While benefit levels in each region largely depend on regional resources, our 
empirical results also lend strong support to the mimicking hypothesis: regional public agents 
observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly. 
6. Conclusions 
The literature on welfare decentralization has traditionally stressed the potential 
positive effects of fiscal devolution both in terms of efficiency and coverage of the programs. 
Regional governments are in a better position to understand both social preferences and needs 
of poor households and generally they can implement these programs more effectively. 
However, the expectation that a decentralized provision of welfare is supposed to foster 
citizens´ wellbeing is challenged by problems of coordination and financing, which at the end 
may produce a mosaic of highly varied programs —with a striking disparity of protection 
levels. In addition, competition among jurisdictions does not always yield the result of 
positive innovation. Ignoring these constraints can result in a generally regressive nationwide 
distribution of benefits, with the richest jurisdictions paying much higher benefits than the 
less wealthy ones.  
These limitations, common to any decentralized welfare system, can be fostered in 
models of “radical fiscal federalism”, where federal coordination and/or funding do not exist. 
This is the case of the Spanish latest safety net design, where these programs were entirely 




In this paper we use panel data for Spanish regions with the aim of answering one 
essential question: Does mimicking among ACs partly explain the level of regional welfare 
benefits in Spain? While the answer to this question is not a priori obvious, our empirical 
results corroborate the presence of significant interterritorial interactions. We find strong 
evidence of a mimicking behavior and horizontal externalities: ACs observe what their 
neighboring governments are doing and then decide their own basic benefit levels. Therefore, 
our results confirm the conventional wisdom on the territorial interdependency of policy 
decisions with respect to welfare benefit levels, even within a highly fiscally decentralized 
framework —where there is no participation of the central government in the design, 
regulation or financing of the system.  
In addition, we find that regions use the central government-determined average 
pension in their respective territories as a benchmark for determining their own welfare 
benefit levels. This also indicates the presence of important vertical externalities in the design 
of decentralized welfare policies. This is more notable, because that vertical externality takes 
place in the context of a “radical fiscal federalism” model. Even in this case, the decisions 
made at one level of government condition those made by other levels of administration.  
These results obtained with static approaches are also confirmed when the proposed 
relationships are analyzed using dynamic models. Given the probable inertia of benefits 
levels, the results obtained under static approaches could be somewhat biased. Our results 
with different dynamic models show that while benefit levels in each region largely depend 
on regional resources, the yardstick competition hypothesis is confirmed again: regional 
public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly. The results of the 
dynamic models also confirm the presence of vertical externalities. 
In short, in this paper we contribute to the current literature by providing strong 




determination of decentralized welfare benefits in contexts where there is complete 
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Figure 1. Regional benefit levels (maximum benefit for each type of household) 
 
 
Table 1: Static approach. 2SLS 16 
 




0.509*** 0.138 0.543*** 0.154 0.305** 0.140 
GDP pc 6.149*** 1.895 5.637** 2.244 8.500*** 2.276 
Poverty -1.571 3.112 2.649 3.315 6.531** 3.229 
Foral 8.586*** 1.246 10.601*** 1.361 10.117*** 1.481 
Ideology -6.634 5.315 0.325 5.008 2.355 5.710 
Recipiency Ratio 1999.658** 816.80 2048.861** 776.0 2107.864** 865.388 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis 






N 270 306 306 
Number of years 21 21 21 
Dependent variable: basic benefit received by an individual irrespective of the size of his/her own household. 
Endogenous variable: neighbor´s basic benefit. 
Instrument: average pension payed by the Social Security in each region. 
N1: neighborhood 1 labels territories that share geographical borders as neighbors; N2: neighborhood 2 labels all territories as 
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Table 2: Static approach: 2SLS. 




0.531*** 0.140 0.542*** 0.154 0.305** 0.140 
GDP pc 6.049*** 1.901 5.649** 2.237 8.498*** 2.278 
Poverty -5.13 3.616 2.551 3.621 6.586* 3.570 
Foral 8.973*** 1.259 10.615*** 1.380 10.109*** 1.501 
Ideology -26.257** 10.997 -0.347 9.895 2.712 10.836 
Poverty*Ideology 8.533** 4.142 0.273 3.495 -0.145 3.806 
Recipiency Ratio 1747.17** 833.751 2040.53** 782.797 2112.01** 871.983 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis 






N 270 306 306 
Number of Years 21 21 21 
Dependent variable: basic benefit received by an individual irrespective of the size of his/her own household. 
Endogenous variable: neighbor´s basic benefit. 
Instrument: average pension payed by the Social Security in each region. 
N1: neighborhood 1 labels territories that share geographical borders as neighbors; N2: neighborhood 2 labels all territories as 
neighbors; N3: neighborhood 3 labels regions with a similar level of per capita income as neighbors.   
 
Table 3: Dynamic approach: Panel Corrected Standard Errors 




0.625*** 0.130 0.724*** 0.138 0.458*** 0.121 
GDP pc 2.940** 1.439 2.347 1.566 3.089* 1.899 
Poverty 9.383*** 2.779 5.866** 2.219 9.183*** 2.377 
Foral 68.225** 26.562 73.033** 31.615 65.494** 27.097 
Ideology -0.855 5.623 -0.906 4.563 6.486 4.70 
Recipiency Ratio 3023.18** 1131.70 4473.65*** 1051.77 5323.03*** 1056.929 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis 
Rho 0.810 0.861 0.796 
N 270 306 306 
Number of Years 21 21 21 
Dependent variable: basic benefit received by an individual irrespective of the size of his/her own household. 
Endogenous variable: neighbor´s basic benefit. 
Instrument: average pension payed by the Social Security in each region. 
N1: neighborhood 1 labels territories that share geographical borders as neighbors; N2: neighborhood 2 labels all territories as 











Table 4: Dynamic approach: Panel Corrected Standard Errors 




0.632*** 0.130 0.740*** 0.127 0.456*** 0.114 
GDP pc 2.891** 1.416 2.218* 1.382 2.926* 1.770 
Poverty 9.163** 3.124 6.489** 2.483 10.633*** 2.739 
Foral 68.690** 26.640 74.057** 29.134 66.453** 25.714 
Ideology 1.275 11.509 8.921 8.881 20.265** 9.317 
Recipiency Ratio 2981.07** 1140.88 4542.08*** 1026.55 5434.93*** 1031.69 
Ideology*Poverty -0.254 4.268 -3.086 3.177 -4.560 3.573 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis Dummy Crisis 
Rho 0.809 0.839 0.776 
N 270 306 306 
Number of years 21 21 21 
Dependent variable: basic benefit received by an individual irrespective of the size of his/her own household. 
Endogenous variable: neighbor´s basic benefit. 
Instrument: average pension payed by the Social Security in each region. 
N1: neighborhood 1 labels territories that share geographical borders as neighbors; N2: neighborhood 2 labels all territories as 








Table A.1: Variables description 
 Description Source 
BB Basic benefit (maximum amount) received by an individual  
BH2A Benefit (maximum amount) received by a household with 2 adults + 2 children  
BH1A Benefit (maximum amount) received by a household with 1 adult + 2 children  
Poverty Severe poverty rate  
Pro-redistribution preferences Percentage of citizens that, asked about the purpose of taxes, answer that they are collected in 
order to better distribute wealth within the society. Constructed based on the results of a poll 
implemented by the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research: “Opinión Pública y Política 
Fiscal”. (1996-2016). 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 
www.cis.es 
Resources As a proxy of regional resources, per capita GDP was used Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
www.ine.es 
Foral Dummy variable that amounts 1 when a special regional financial regime applies  
Ideology Dummy variable that amounts 1 with a left-wing or center-left-wing incumbent   
Pension Average Social Security pension in t-2 in region i Social Security 
www.seg-social.es 
NWBB Neighbors´ welfare basic benefits in t-1  
NWBH2A Neighbors´ welfare benefits for households with 2 adults + 2 children in t-1  
NWBH1A Neighbors´ welfare benefits for households with 1 adult + 2 children in t-1  
RecipRatio Recipiency ratio: share of total population that qualifies for welfare benefits  




CV Valencia  
CLM Castile-La Mancha  
Mu Murcia  
Ma Madrid  
An Andalusia  
CI Canary Islands  
Ctb Cantabria  
Ex Extremadura  
Cat Catalonia  
Ga Galicia  
CyLe Castile-Leon  
BI Balearic Islands  
As Asturias  
Ar Aragon  
Na Navarra  











Table A.2: Variables’ Descriptive Statistics 
 N Average Standard Deviation Min Max 
BB 340 345.7 94.9 180.3 665.9 
BH2A 340 486.9 144.7 180.3 945.9 
BH1A 340 449.5 136.1 180.3 941.1 
Poverty 340 2.39 1.07 0.36 7.15 
Pro-redistribution preferences 238 11.0 6.94 0 42.4 
Resources 340 19.4 5.37 7.76 32.2 
Foral 340 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Ideology 340 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Pension (Neighborhood 1) 323 618.6 162.8 363.4 985.8 
Pension (Neighborhood 2) 323 621.2 156.5 395.3 878.3 
Pension (Neighborhood 3) 323 622.6 168.5 366.8 1076.7 
NWBB (Neighborhood 1) 340 304.6 134.4 0 537.3 
NWBB (Neighborhood 2) 340 345.8 74.6 222.5 444.2 
NWBB (Neighborhood 3) 340 345.5 89.2 205.0 665.9 
NWBH2A (Neighborhood 1) 340 420.9 192.3 0 768.5 
NWBH2A (Neighborhood 2) 340 486.9 102.6 306.1 622.9 
NWBH2A (Neighborhood 3) 340 486.6 131.0 272.9 945.9 
NWBH1A (Neighborhood 1) 340 388.8 178.5 0 716.2 
NWBH1A (Neighborhood 2) 340 486.9 102.6 306.1 622.9 
NWBH1A (Neighborhood 3) 340 449.4 125.9 252.4 945.9 





Table A.3: First Stage Estimations. Static model. 
 (1) N1 (2) N2 (3) N3 (4) N1 (5) N2 (6) N3 
GDPpc 3.925*** 5.766*** 5.016*** 3.935*** 5.675*** 4.985*** 
Poverty -13.005*** -2.937** -8.201** -10.130*** -2.034 -7.591** 
Foral 0.995 -0.661 -1.754 0.690 -0.789 -1.839 
Ideology 8.127** 1.598 -6.145 22.659** 7.879** -2.240 
Ideology*Poverty    -6.377** -2.554** -1.594 
Recipiency Ratio 1431.71** -1281.57*** -2673.24*** 1596.78** -1208.23*** -2625.54*** 
Social Security Pensions 0.392*** 0.345*** 0.432*** 0.386*** 0.346*** 0.432*** 












Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits 
Instrument: average Social Security Pension in neighbors´ territories 
 
Table A.4: First Stage Estimations. Panel Corrected Standard Errors Model 
 (7) N1 (8) N2 (9) N3 (10)  N1 (11)  N2 (12)  N3 
GDPpc 3.925*** 5.766*** 5.016*** 3.935*** 5.675*** 4.985*** 
Poverty -13.005*** -2.937** -8.201** -10.130*** -2.034 -7.591** 
Foral 0.995 -0.661 -1.754 0.690 -0.789* -1.839* 
Ideology 8.127** 1.598 -6.145 22.659** 7.879** -2.240 
Recipiency Ratio 1431.716** -1281.57*** -2673.24*** 1596.78** -1208.23*** -2625.547*** 
Social Security Pensions 0.392*** 0.345*** 0.432*** 0.386*** 0.346*** 0.432*** 
Ideology*Poverty    -6.377** -2.554** -1.594 












Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits 
Instrument: average Social Security Pension in neighbors´ territories 
 
